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SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING, ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING:  A PROCESSUAL VIEW2  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Consistent with calls for in-depth studies of social and environmental accounting and reporting 
(SEAR) intervention (Bebbington, 2007; Fraser, 2012; Contrafatto, 2012), our paper focuses on 
the inter-relationship between organisational change and SEAR practices, as well as the 
involvement of management accounting in such organisational dynamics. Drawing insight from 
both Laughlin (1991) and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) theoretical frameworks, we explore the 
processes of change through which SEAR practices become elevated to strategising status, in 
the context of broader organisational and extra-organisational developments, but we also 
illuminate how institutionalised assumptions of profit-seeking limit the extent to which broader 
sustainability concerns become infused into day-to-day business practice. Our paper highlights 
the importance of management accounting in facilitating and shaping the cumulative path of 
SEAR practices (and sustainability more generally); however, we also heed caution against 
uncritical reliance upon conventional management accounting tools. The following paper extends 
our understanding of SEAR practices as cumulative process over time, an awareness of the 
potential limits to such developments in profit-seeking organisations, and stresses a need to be 
circumspect when involving management accounting. 
 
KEYWORDS: Social and environmental accounting and reporting (SEAR); Organisational 
change; Processes of change; Management accounting; Profit-seeking; Institutions. 
                                                 
2 The authors would like to thank Stephen Jollands, our reviewers and especially the guest editors, Jan 
Bebbington and Ian Thomson, for their constant advice and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. 
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1 - Introduction 
 “[…] the current economic crisis is putting enormous pressure on the functioning of management 
accounting systems in most organizations in the world […] Strategies are […] being constantly 
recast, illustrating in the process the importance of being strategic rather than merely having a 
strategy. Ad hoc analyses of a multitude of different aspects of the economic functioning of the 
organization are becoming a form of standard practice. Management accounting is moving to 
operating in continuous time. In these and many other ways economic information flows are 
assuming an ever greater salience in the management of organizational affairs” (Hopwood, 
2009a, pp.799-800). 
 
 
It is well documented that management accounting information could play a fundamental role in 
the progress of the corporate initiatives towards sustainable development (Thomson, 2007). 
Management accounting, as a primary source of information within organisations, is paramount 
to the diffusion of social and environmental accounting and reporting (SEAR) practices and 
sustainability know-how. Its tools and techniques underpin the means by which tomorrow’s 
organisations define, measure and both internally and externally report their social and 
environmental impact; and the role of a management accountant is thus critically important in this 
respect. As the above quotation suggests, management accounting is becoming increasingly 
complex, fluid and integrated within broader organisational and extra-organisational processes; 
there is, it seems, a growing demand in business and society for information. An important aspect 
of these developments is the interplay between management accounting and sustainability-
related issues (including sustainability accounting and reporting); yet very little is known about 
such interplay (Thomson, 2007). 
 
Today’s organisations are increasingly open to pressures to be more socially and 
environmentally responsible when they conduct their business. Accounting and reporting on 
social and environmental aspects has become common practice for most leading organisations 
(KPMG, 2011). ‘Being and acting’ towards sustainable development, at least as it has been 
defined by many organisations, has been elevated to a higher tier of managerial concerns. That 
is, nowadays sustainability issues appear to be part of an organisation’s strategic concerns.  
 
Although the term ‘sustainability’ has been debated in the organisational literature for some time, 
there is still ambiguity concerning its meaning (Gray, 2011) and whether (and how) this notion 
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can be applied in the context of business and corporations (Milne et al, 2009; Gray and Milne, 
2002; Bebbington, 2007). The varied and not always consistent terminologies used, in one way 
or another normally refer to the definition provided by the United Nations Commission for 
Sustainable Development in 1987, according to which a development is ‘sustainable’ if it is able 
to “meet the needs of the present generations without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (UNWCED, 1987). Thus, sustainability represents 
fundamentally a ‘global’ (Gray and Milne, 2002) and ‘spatial’ concept (Bebbington, 2007) that 
refers to the “properties of a physical system in some physical space” and its capacity to sustain 
(Bebbington, 2007, p.234). The concept of sustainability embraces notions of eco-efficiency in 
the use of resources; and eco-socio justice in their distribution between current generations (i.e. 
intra-generational) and between present and future generations (i.e. inter-generational).  
 
Some authors contend (see for example Gray and Milne, 2002) whether this notion can be 
applied in the context of business and corporations and, if so, what the implications for their 
undertakings would be. Nevertheless, business and corporations are strongly implicated in this 
ongoing debate and they have, and indeed they had, an important role to play in the process of 
developing (or not) sustainably through the adoption of more responsible behaviours, initiatives 
and practices 3, including management, accounting and reporting.  
 
Sustainability (accounting and) reporting4 is going through a rapid and detailed change process. 
From a situation of, say, just 20 years ago when a handful of organisations produced basic social 
                                                 
3 In much of the corporate environmentalism literature the debate about sustainable development 
has been framed around the ‘environment-development’ dichotomy (Milne et al, 2009). At one 
extreme, there is a more ‘economic-business-grounded’ position which professes the centrality of 
economic growth; the prominence of technological and scientific progress; and the pivotal role of 
business and corporations in identifying solutions to social and environmental problems (see 
Milne et al, 2009 for further discussion). Alternatively, there is an ‘eco-bio-grounded’ perspective 
whose central values are the supremacy of ‘nature’; the existence of ecological limits to economic 
growth; and the fundamental unsustainability of corporations. Within these two extremes, several 
scholars (see for example Colby, 1991 and Olsen et al, 1992) have sought to identify a “middle 
ground” or “in-between” perspective as an attempt to synthesise the “fundamental conflict 
between anthropocentric and bio-centric values” (Milne et al, 2009, p. 1215-1216). It is in this 
unresolved and ongoing ‘conflict’ that much of the current debate about sustainable development, 
and the role that business and corporations play, can be positioned.                         
4 In this paper we use the term ‘sustainability accounting and reporting’ in a loose sense to 
indicate the range of topics and issues that are normally included in the SEAR literature. For a 
more detailed discussion and critical understanding of whether corporate sustainability reporting 
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and/or environmental accounts, we now see a bandwagon of organisations clamouring to be the 
first, best and most innovative owners of fully ‘integrated reports’ which attempt to combine social 
and environmental impact with the traditional accounts of financial performance. All of this 
requires information, usually drawn from a company’s management accounting systems, and 
overseen by the management accountant. In turn, we also see an avalanche of new 
management accounting tools that, it is claimed by their advocates, provide a more effective way 
to bring sustainability concerns ‘into’ an organisation; although, as we develop in this paper, most 
of these tools tend to be premised on an assumption of ‘profit-optimising outcomes’ (Scapens, 
1994). 
  
Our paper aims to better understand the ongoing interrelationship(s) between SEAR and 
management accounting, in the context of broader organisational and extra-organisational 
developments. We present a longitudinal case study of why, and particularly how, an Italian 
multinational organisation’s (MARIO, hereafter) SEAR practices evolved over time, and the 
organizational effects of such developments. We present this evolution as complex (change) 
processes over time, highlighting the cumulative interplay between accounting tools and both 
organisational and extra-organisational change.  
 
We observe a growing importance for management accounting, as SEAR practices (and 
sustainability issues more generally) assume a more significant position in an organisation’s 
strategic planning. However, we also highlight limits to such developments, as profit-seeking 
ways maintain their institutionalised status as ‘the way we do things around here’. In our case 
study we observe the establishment of multiple SEAR-related tools and techniques and, 
importantly, that such practices were (at least assumed to be) consistent with dominant corporate 
objectives for earning economic profits. 
 
Our case study highlights complexity in the development and effects of SEAR practices over 
time, and stresses how such complexity needs to be understood in its broad organisational and 
external context. We offer insights into whether (and how and when) SEAR practices might be 
                                                                                                                                                 
is achievable or even possible, and what it should look like, refer for example to Gray & Milne 
(2002), and Bebbington (2007).  
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developed in a manner that mobilises change in organisational behaviour within a broader 
sustainable development agenda (Larrinaga and Bebbington, 2001; Bebbington, 2007). More 
specifically, we are drawn to consider how, in some organisations, the engineering of SEAR 
practices over time can constitute part of a broader change process, whereby sustainability 
principles and values become integral to organisational strategies and high-level corporate 
values (Adams & McNicholas, 2007), as opposed to some stand-alone project.  
 
In this sense, to an extent we see some progress within MARIO, but we also see how dominant 
business assumptions focused on earning profits limit the degree to which sustainability can (if 
ever) eventually become an overriding strategic goal. We raise questions about how an 
organisation’s attempt to ‘embed’ sustainability into routine activities needs to be viewed in the 
context of changeable external circumstances and other inter-linked organisational activities, but 
especially in the context of dominant and taken-for-granted business ways of operating. That is, 
although our case study presents a useful story of implementing SEAR-related innovations, we 
find that it is ultimately assumptions underlying the pursuit of economic profits which are 
dominant to the extent that SEAR changes appear to need to be designed within rather than 
outside of such constraints.  
 
The approach that we adopt is ‘processual’ in the sense that we explore the development (and 
effects) of SEAR practices as cumulative process(es) over time (Burns, 2000; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). Also, our methodological approach is holistic, in that rather than explore an 
organisation’s SEAR practices and corporate sustainability strategies in isolation, we investigate 
their evolution in the context of broader and ongoing organisational, social and environmental 
context(s). Theoretically, we interpret our findings through a lens that draws from Laughlin (1991) 
and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) frameworks of organisational and accounting change. As we 
develop later, these frameworks are sufficiently complementary, and they help to inform our 
narrative of the interplay and dynamics between SEAR practices, organisational change and 
extra-organisational developments. Laughlin’s (1991) framework of organisational change has 
been adopted by numerous scholars of social accounting (e.g., Gray et al, 1995; Larrinaga et al, 
2001; Fraser, 2012) to investigate whether and, if so, to what extent social/environmental 
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accounting tools become implicated in organisational change. Rather less-used in SEAR 
research to date, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework particularly assists us in teasing out why 
and how the change dynamics unfold over time as they do (Fraser, 2012). Together, both 
theoretical frameworks present ‘a way of seeing’ the observed change processes in MARIO, 
which in turn allows us to construct a case study narrative. 
 
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. In the next section we look at extant works 
that have previously investigated SEAR-organisational change dynamics and, in so doing, we are 
then able to highlight some gaps in the literature towards which this paper seeks to contribute. 
Following that, we articulate the theory which assists us to interpret our empirical evidence, and 
we briefly describe our research methods. We then present our case study and, finally, we 
discuss some of the key issues that are highlighted from the case study, including theoretical 
reflection and consideration of the future role and functioning of management accounting in 
SEAR practice and the pursuit of sustainability in organisations more generally. 
 
2 - SEAR and Organisational Change 
Over the last two decades a handful of scholars have investigated the dynamics and effects of 
SEAR in specific organisational domains (see Bebbington, 2007 for a review of this work). The 
first empirical investigations appeared from the mid-1990s, primarily examining how 
organisations were responding to environmental issues around that time period (see Gray et al, 
1995; Buhr, 1998; Larrinaga et al, 2001; and Larrinaga and Bebbington, 2001). These early 
studies particularly focused on the role of environmental accounting and reporting for shaping the 
“processes by which organizations go green” (Larrinaga and Bebbington, 2001, p. 279).  
 
Since the turn of the last century, the focus of such work has expanded, and now includes 
investigation of additional forms of accounting interventions, such as: (1) social accounting book-
keeping systems (Dey, 2007); (2) sustainability reporting (Adams and McNicholas, 2007); (3) 
environmental management systems (Albelda et al, 2007); and (4) specific social accounting 
technology such as ‘sustainability assessment models’ (SAM) (Fraser, 2012) and ‘full cost 
accounting’ (FCA) (see Antheaume, 2007 for a review of such studies).  
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Notwithstanding an increase in this body of research over the last decade, in-depth empirical 
investigation and critical evaluation of SEAR practices and their effects remains relatively scarce 
(Dey, 2007; Fraser, 2012). There is a dearth of understanding as to what today’s organisations 
are really doing (and why and how) in respect of their SEAR practices. For instance, it would 
seem there is still much to be learned in terms of management intentions and motivation, hidden 
agendas, (dis-)incentivisation, unintended consequences, challenges, (re-)actions, and more. 
Yet, as we argue, it is important that we continue to try to understand more about such processes 
if we wish to better conceptualise, design and facilitate new tools that will help nurture more 
social and environmentally-sensitive organisational behaviour. 
 
The SEAR-organizational change literature to-date predominantly focuses on two main issues, 
namely: (1) the role of SEAR in promoting organisational change, including focus on the change 
outcome(s) per se, and (2) the “assemblage of factors” (Duncan and Thomson, 1998) which 
either facilitate or stifle SEAR interventions. With respect to (1), many of the previous works (e.g. 
Gray et al, 1995; Larrinaga et al, 2001; Adams and McNicholas, 2007; Albelda et al, 2007) have 
tended to concentrate on SEAR intervention outcomes rather than on the dynamics of change 
over time. Moreover, there has been even less prior discussion and investigation of the role of 
management accounting in the SEAR (-related) processes (of change) (Thomson, 2007). In 
particular, and as argued by Bebbington, “the way in which such changes systematically play out 
[…] [still] remains speculative […] under-specified and under-theorised” (2007, pp.228-9).  
 
In relation to (2) above, recent studies have tended to investigate the dynamics and assemblages 
of factors which foster and/or hinder change (see e.g. Dey, 2007; Fraser, 2012). This said, there 
remains a dearth of research into why and how SEAR change first emerges, then unravels as it 
does in real organisations. In particular, as suggested by Bebbington (2007), there is need to 
extend the investigation of the way in which the various ‘factors’ (e.g. legislation, the appointment 
of senior managers) manifest themselves, interweave with each other and intervene into 
organisational life if one wants to understand why and how change occurs (or does not) in 
specific settings.  
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3 - Theoretical Approach 
Our theoretical approach draws upon insights from two complementary frameworks, namely 
Laughlin’s (1991) framework of organisational change, and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
conceptualisation of accounting change as cumulative processes over time. Both frameworks can 
be used to investigate the dynamics of intra-organisational change, in a context where 
organisations are continuously subject to powerful ‘environmental disturbances’ (Laughlin, 1991); 
these disturbances provide both resource and constraints for change to occur. 
 
Laughlin’s framework is probably more familiar to SEAR scholars, whereas Burns and Scapens 
(2000) is probably less so, yet oft-used in the management accounting (change) literature. While 
the specific nature of each framework differs, for example, in their respective philosophical 
origins, primary foci and levels of analysis, their underlying purpose is consistent if not entirely 
complementary. First, both frameworks view organisational (including accounting) change as 
socially-constructed, and constituting socially-embedded processes over time. Second, a 
fundamental purpose of both approaches is to ‘sensitise’ researchers to the cumulative, complex 
and interwoven aspects of organisational change. Given such consistencies, we argue that it is 
justifiable, indeed sensible, to utilise and combine insight(s) from both frameworks to assist in 
understanding the processes of reproduction and development of SEAR practices in 
organisations. We argue that combined use of these two frameworks will, in time, contribute more 
than the sum of its parts. And, as a consequence, their combined lens will offer considerable 
potential for conceptualising the evolving ‘life’, and effects, of an organisation’s SEAR practices. 
However, we should point out at an early stage that it is not our intention in this paper to look at 
creating an integrated or hybrid lens from these two extant frameworks. We shall return to the 
implications for combining the two theoretical frameworks in the conclusions of our paper; but, 
first, we briefly outline the key aspects to Laughlin’s (1991) and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
theoretical frameworks. 
 
Environmental disturbances and organisational change: Laughlin (1991) 
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Laughlin (1991) describes organisations as comprising a series of interpretive schemes, design 
archetypes and sub-systems which for a large part remain in a state of equilibrium (or dynamic 
stability) over time, until they are ‘disturbed’ (Gray et al., 1995; Bebbington, 2007). According to 
Laughlin, this amalgam of interpretive schemes, archetypes and sub-systems will remain 
generally stable, unless some ‘external’ or ‘internal’ disturbance causes a shift in their balance, 
and a subsequent change begins to restore this balance and stability. It is explicitly recognised 
that accounting (information) can play a role in bringing about such change (and/or in re-
establishing stability). 
 
Interpretive schemes can be broken down further into three different levels, namely: (1) beliefs, 
values and norms, (2) an organisation’s mission/purpose, and (3) organisational ‘meta-rules’. 
Design archetypes comprise such things as organisational structure(s), decision-making 
processes and communication systems. Finally, sub-systems comprise tangible phenomena 
such as infrastructure, pollution and other readily-observable items. 
 
Some scholars have adopted Laughlin’s framework to explore the application of new business 
practice(s) or archetypes, and cast light on the ‘assemblage of factors and outcomes’ of such 
organisational change (Fraser, 2012). In particular, the extant literature has focused mainly on: 
(1) the extent to which new archetypes might (not) impact on peoples’ thinking, and permeate an 
organisation’s interpretive schemes, and (2) the role of ‘environmental disturbances’ for 
catalysing changes in an organisation’s dynamic stability.  
 
Where organisational change occurs, Laughlin broadly defines two categories of change, as 
follows: (1) morphostatic (1st-order) change, which involves some level of change in design 
archetypes, possibly in tangible sub-systems but not in terms of interpretive schemes, and (2) 
morphogenetic (2nd-order) change, whereby change in an organisation’s design archetypes also 
results in changes to sub-systems and interpretive schemes. He further categorises morphostatic 
change in terms of: (1) rebuttal, where ultimately there is actually no change in the design 
archetype (e.g., where a change is rejected), and (2) re-orientation whereby some change may 
occur in respect of the organisational archetypes and possibly sub-systems. On the other hand, 
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morphogenetic change, is categorised in terms of: (1) colonization, where there is fundamental 
organisational change catalysed usually in design archetypes (and usually imposed) but also with 
diffusion to and impacts on interpretive schemes and sub-systems, and (2) evolution, which is 
change that emerges within interpretive schemes. 
 
An Old Institutional Economics Framework of Change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) 
An old institutional economics (OIE) theoretical framework views some business practices as 
institutionalised routines that facilitate the reproduction and legitimacy of organisational behaviour 
and which, in turn, brings cohesion to day-to-day organisational life (Scapens, 1994). Such 
theorising has been used previously to conceptualise an organisation’s management accounting 
practices5; but, we argue, it can also be used as a way to view SEAR practices. An institutional 
approach focuses on intra-organisational processes (of change) over time, and is therefore a 
potentially useful way to extend our understanding of the re-production and/or change in SEAR 
practices. 
 
An OIE framework conceptualises organisations as comprising a multitude of (interacting) rules 
and routines which bring cohesion and underlying stability to organisational practice (Scapens, 
1994). Rules are “the formally recognized way in which ‘things should be done’” (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000, p.6), and their repetition can shape what we define as being routines or “the way 
in which ‘things are actually done’” (ibid.). Over time, the interaction between organisational rules 
and routines can take on more normative traits and become institutionalised. An institution is “a 
way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits 
of a group or the customs of a people” (Hamilton, 1932, p.84). In this paper we are particularly 
concerned with intra-organisational institutions; that is, the taken-for-granted and unquestioned 
‘things we do around here’, embedded within and specific to individual organisations.  
 
                                                 
5 E.g., Burns (2000), Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005), Burns and Quinn (2011), Burns and 
Scapens (2000), Busco et al. (2006), Johansson and Baldvinsdottir (2003), Lukka (2007), Quinn 
(2011), Ribeiro and Scapens (2006), Scapens (1994), Scapens (2006), Siti-Nabiha and Scapens 
(2005), Soin et al. (2002). 
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Burns and Scapens (2000) argued that management accounting systems, tools and techniques 
can be viewed as rules (i.e., formalised procedures) which will usually become routinised through 
their ongoing (re-)enactment. Here, in a similar way, we argue that SEAR practices can be 
conceptualised as organisational rules which, in time, can become routinised and potentially 
institutionalised.  
 
Thus, in exploring why and how SEAR practices evolved over time in MARIO, we will focus to a 
large extent on changes in organisational rules and routines. An OIE approach conveys much of 
organisational practice (including SEAR) as remaining fairly constant over time, underpinned by 
the relevant (and inter-connected) rules and routines. This picture of relative stability resonates 
with Laughlin’s notion of ‘equilibrium’ (or ‘dynamic stability’). However, there is a fundamental 
difference; whereas Laughlin’s framework presents more of a stop-go sequence of environmental 
disturbances and organisational stability (Gray et al, 1995), an OIE framework places the 
regularity of rules and routines-based organisational practice as part of ongoing processes over 
time. Thus, in an OIE framework, rules and routines are conceived as being part of ongoing 
processes of replication, adaptation, modification and/or change over time. Change can happen, 
in terms of (new) rules or routines but, importantly, ‘no-change’ does not mean ‘static’. 
Institutional change, on the other hand, is generally more difficult and less likely to occur than 
changes in rules or routines. The latter can, for example, be viewed as an introduction of new 
organisational practices (e.g., SEAR practices) which, through repetition, can become routinised. 
However, by definition, institutions are deeply-rooted, often tacit assumptions, and usually not 
questioned, but generally ‘just accepted’. As such, it can be difficult to even recognise and 
acknowledge intra-organisational institutions, let alone to try to change them. 
 
4 - Research Methods 
Our small but hopefully not insignificant contribution to this important area is a case study, 
spanning 8 years, of the (re-)development and organisational effects of SEAR practices in an 
Italian multinational organisation, (MARIO), which operates in the energy sector. The narrative 
that we give begins in earnest around the mid-2000s, although our ‘on site’ investigation was 
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conducted over a twenty-month period in 2011-126.  Data was collected through a combination of 
methods and using different sources, including interviews. 
 
We began our empirical work with an analysis of MARIO’s web site and other publicly-available 
information, the main purpose of which was to get a sense of the most recent initiatives that had 
been undertaken by the organisation in respect of its SEAR practices and sustainability more 
generally. Following this, at the beginning of 2011, a first formal contact was made with two 
senior managers. Interviews held with these particular managers were especially helpful, as they 
established good access across the company.  
 
The remainder of our interviews were carried out from 2011 to 2012. In total, we held interviews 
with ten different senior managers, most from MARIO but also a few who worked for a research 
centre, founded by MARIO, which became associated with SEAR-development (see later). In 
order to guarantee the anonymity of the interviewed personnel we use Roman numerals (I, II, III, 
etc). All of our interviews were conducted in Italian, and one of the co-authors attended all of 
these interviews. Each interview was recorded and fully transcribed; and the time taken for 
interviews varied between forty-five minutes and two hours. The interviews focused in particular 
on the processes through which SEAR evolved in MARIO, especially the organisational 
consequences of SEAR intervention and the impact on SEAR practices of multiple organisational 
changes through a period of just over eight years since mid-2000s to 2012. 
 
Finally, other methods adopted to collect our data, included: (1) observations while conducting 
interviews; (2) correspondence via email and telephone; (3) further analysis of MARIO’s web site; 
(4) close examination of various corporate social/sustainability reports; and (5) other publicly-
available corporate information. In analysing our empirical data, in particular our transcripts, we 
followed rigorous and systematic procedures, including coding (O’Dwyer, 2004). 
 
                                                 
6 The organisation was investigated over a decade ago by one of the current authors to explore, 
in particular, the motives and dynamics through which SEAR was initiated (see Contrafatto, 2009 
for further empirical details of this initial investigation). More recently a follow up project was 
conducted to explicitly investigate the organisational effects of SEAR over time, the results of 
which are reported in the present paper. 
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5 – SEAR, Organisational Change and the External Environment: a narrative of their 
(cumulative) interplay over time 
 
As stated at the outset of this paper, our empirical investigation covers (including retrospective 
study) a prolonged period from the mid-2000s until 2012. It was over this period that SEAR 
practices evolved and were implicated in a further process of penetrating corporate life. As a 
reference point for the reader, we include a timeline of the key events in the development of 
SEAR practices which occurred during the period of our study (see Figure 1). 
 
Include Figure 1. 
  
In particular, as illuminated by our empirical analysis, SEAR and related principles and 
techniques underwent significant change to become part of, and involved in, the formulation, 
planning and control of corporate strategies. The characteristics underpinning such change 
processes are developed in the remainder of this section. What follows is a narrative of the 
dynamics and effects of change(s) which occurred in both: (1) SEAR, as a result of changes in 
the organisational domain, and (2) the organisation (MARIO), as a consequence of SEAR 
intervention. The story is a complex one, which we now try to articulate in a comprehensible way 
and following which (later) we will elaborate on some of the emerging key issues, particularly in 
relation to the dynamics between SEAR, organisational change and management accounting. 
 
Environmental disturbances  
The seeds of SEAR practices in MARIO began during the mid-1990s and became quite 
structured and more established by the early-2000s (further empirical details of these processes 
may be found elsewhere, see Contrafatto, 2009).  
 
However, it was after the mid-2000s that SEAR was elevated to a position of greater importance, 
and moved upwards in terms of the strategic agenda; and, it is from this period that our focus 
began in earnest for the present paper. As one interviewee commented, the mid-2000s signalled 
the point from which MARIO discarded its ‘Health, Safety and Environment” (HS&E) focus and 
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moved to a “Sustainability era” (Interviewee I, 08/2011). As observed by another interviewee, 
someone who personally experienced these changes, with this new ‘era’ “a series of initiatives 
were undertaken for systematising and implementing sustainability principles and values in our 
organisation” (Interviewee II, 08/2011). Before investigating the processual dynamics through 
which sustainability issues increasingly became part of the process of corporate strategic 
planning, we now turn our attention to events and factors which stimulated changes in the 
organisational equilibrium of MARIO. 
 
Corporate awareness of the growing importance of sustainable development advanced with the 
combined impact of three exogenous factors or ‘environmental jolts’ (Laughlin, 1991), namely: (1) 
increased regulation through an industry-wide ‘transparency and accountability initiative’, (2) a 
general increase at societal level of the importance of such issues as climate change and human 
rights’ protection, and (3) other expected legislation which MARIO’s senior management aimed to 
anticipate in advance rather than be subjected to coercive ‘shocks’.  
 
The principal outflow of these exogenous influences was the explicit and pro-active elevation of 
sustainability issues (including SEAR practices) to corporate strategic level. These three 
externally-rooted developments ruptured the organisational equilibrium, and created openings for 
organisational change to occur (Laughlin, 1991; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005). And, it was at 
this stage of the change process that internal-grounded (or endogenous) organisational change 
begins to emerge. First, MARIO’s senior management conceded that sustainability was a 
strategic matter that must become an integral part of strategic decision making. This significant 
development was initially borne out in mid-2000s, when MARIO produced a new corporate 
document entitled “Corporate responsibility, values and conduct”, the intention of which was to 
investigate in general the potential implications of sustainability for MARIO. Commissioned and 
promoted by the senior management, this report held considerable symbolic value and political 
clout, and was instrumental for formalising sustainability rules and routines into organisational 
activity and discourse.  
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Second, still in the same period, the appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from 
outside MARIO brought a whole new level of impetus to a change process that by now was 
beginning to gather some momentum. This new senior executive had the power to mobilise 
change, and was determined amongst other things to take the organisation much further (and 
quickly) in its quest to develop sustainability-rooted practices. S/he, more than anyone else, was 
the main instigator of multiple new rules to establish sustainability as being strategic, and to forge 
ahead with the ‘sustainability era’.  
 
So, while the three exogenous drivers (described above) created openings for organisational 
change to occur, it was the new CEO in particular who visualised and championed such change.  
External developments by themselves are not usually sufficient to trigger (nor enact) intra- 
organisational change; agency is key, normally underpinned by the power ‘to get things done’ 
(Burns, 2000; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005), as one interviewee implied: 
 
There was a significant change of pace in 200[X], when our new CEO was 
appointed. Due to [her/his] works’ experience abroad, as well as time s/he had 
spent in other major companies, the CEO appreciated positive effects of integrating 
sustainability into our organisational processes. The CEO had a holistic view of 
sustainability, and a wider understanding of the positive impacts that sustainability 
integration can bring to corporate life (Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
 
Laughlin’s (1991) framework would portray the CEO’s arrival as representing a form of 
‘determinant’ environmental disturbance which challenges the status quo in MARIO, but an OIE-
influenced interpretation would supplement this to highlight the ‘opening’ created by such external 
developments, followed by visionary and power-infused agency of the CEO over a period of time 
(Burns, 2000). The CEO embraced a stimulus that was created by the external circumstances 
and, as we develop below, s/he continues to play a key and proactive role in mobilising further 
complementary and reinforcing changes in the future: 
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The new CEO, even more than before, argued that from then on, ‘sustainability’ was to be 
a fundamental aspect of our way of conducting business (Interviewee VIII, 10/2012). 
 
The first significant action taken by the CEO was the creation of strong links to a Centre of 
Research (COR), which would come to serve as a strong support mechanism for her/him to 
extend the reach of sustainability strategies across MARIO and, in the words of one interviewee 
“began to construct a sustainability community” (Interviewee II, 08/2011). The remit for COR was 
the promotion of innovative environmental and sustainability policies: 
 
The new CEO pushed our company to continuously involve COR. COR, a centre of 
competencies and expertise, was kept involved because it could help [MARIO] to 
implement sustainability (Interviewee, II, 08/2011). 
 
In Laughlin’s (1991) terms, the involvement of the Centre was another powerful ‘environmental 
disturbance’ which provided further impetus for ongoing organisational change. As stated by a 
different interviewee:  
 
Through the involvement of COR, we were able to draw on their wide experience. 
The process of establishing a structure for sustainability would have been much more 
complex if COR had not been involved (Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
 
In the same year, the CEO was also instrumental in creating a Sustainability Project, the first 
tangible organisational effect (Laughlin, 1991) of the unfolding change programme. A 
management team was created to oversee what was, from the outset, declared as an ‘interim 
unit’ before a more permanent sustainability unit could be formalised. The Sustainability Project 
was also established as a forerunner to more permanent (sustainability) policies, and whose 
main remit was to gather relevant information from around the organisation. However, it did 
have its own constitution, and was made responsible for a particularly important task (see 
below):  
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I was involved in this [sustainability] ‘project’ since the beginning […] the first thing we did 
was a screening of our internal operations to understand what was our state of the art; 
then we did a sort of external benchmarking to identify existing ‘good practice’. Finally, we 
used both sets of information to start our activities and to figure out what we could do 
(Interviewee VIII, 10/2012). 
 
The main strength of the ‘project’ probably lay in its organisational-wide representation. Thus, 
there were several inter-linked working groups whose composition included representatives 
from both existing structures (e.g., the HS&E department), and also people who were more 
geared to where MARIO was heading in the future (i.e., COR). This ‘bridging’ from, or building-
on existing structures, as opposed to displacing the ‘old’, encapsulates much of what Burns and 
Scapens (2000) referred to as ‘evolutionary’ change and, as will be seen, this is a recurring 
theme in the life-story of MARIO’s ‘sustainability-era’:  
 
The nice thing about the Project was that it was organised in joint-working groups, which 
included personnel of both MARIO and COR. The real positive aspect of this joint project 
was that it was not an alien structure that undermined the role or authority of incumbent 
people. On the contrary, it was more about process of integration and mediation 
(Interviewee II, 08/2011).  
 
Next, a new corporate report was issued by the Sustainability Project, entitled ‘Commitments and 
Initiatives for Sustainable Development’. One interviewee described the report as a “manifesto” 
for MARIO’s sustainability programme and, again, a large part of this rules-based document 
extended (rather than displaced) HS&E’s existing manifesto:  
 
It was basically a sort of a White Paper, a manifesto, a positioning paper about all that 
would come in later years with regards to sustainability issues. It was a document of intent 
(Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
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The constitution of the ‘sustainability project’, strengthened by the publication of this report, 
accelerated the process of transformation in the MARIO’s sub-systems and design archetypes 
(Laughlin, 1991). One year after the Project’s inauguration, a Sustainability Department was 
created by the Project’s management, whose broad remit was to account for, manage, control 
and report on all matters sustainability-related. Consistent with changes made thus far, the 
composition of this department was not too radically different from past structures, although 
‘some’ new staff were appointed from outside. The previous department which was responsible 
for managing corporate social responsibility issues was absorbed into the new Sustainability 
Department and the HS&E department (which had existed for several years) was re-structured 
but not disbanded. 
 
Simultaneously with the creation of its new Sustainability Department, the Project also created 
the ‘MARIO Foundation’, which was intended to promote, undertake and manage the 
philanthropic activities of the organisation, on behalf of outside communities and other external 
stakeholder groups. 
 
The analysis undertaken in this paper illuminates that the formation of the ‘Sustainability Project’ 
and the publication of ‘Commitment and Initiatives for Sustainable Development’, which were the 
outcome of environmental disturbances of the previous years (e.g. appointment of new CEO), 
also represented a medium for further changes in the other components of organisational life, 
such as design archetypes.  
  
The Sustainability Department issued the company’s first “Guidelines on Sustainability and 
Protection of Human Rights”, and published its first “Sustainability Report”. The guidelines 
comprised a set of policies (i.e., rules), endorsed by the CEO and COR, hence underpinned by 
sufficient power to enforce them. Once again, there was a degree of evolution as opposed to 
revolution in such change, since these ‘new’ policies were largely an extension of the previous 
HS&E guidelines: 
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The Sustainability Guidelines provided not only guidelines on how to manage, plan and 
report sustainability issues but also accounted for how to achieve the integration of 
sustainability principles and values in corporate processes. In other words, they were not 
just a picture of what we were doing but also an account of what we wanted to achieve 
with the reporting (Interviewee II, 08/2011). 
 
The new policies reinforced the change process, as the formally recognised rules for how and 
what to ‘do’ specifically in collating and producing the forthcoming ‘Sustainability Report’. For 
example, the rules established expectations in respect of the appropriate format of the 
sustainability report, and the re-enactment of which would eventually foster routinised practice 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). Also, the guidelines established what kind of information was 
needed for inclusion in the new Sustainability Report, as well as stipulating who and what needed 
to be monitored and regulated (and by whom) in the new sustainability reporting process.  
 
MARIO’s first Sustainability Report was an integration of all previously published social and 
environmental documents (e.g., the HS&E and other ‘social reports’). So, to an extent, there was 
an amalgamation of existing rules and routines but, although past traits were passed on, the 
combined new report also conveyed some new and idiosyncratic features: 
 
We do not think of the Sustainability Reporting as an incorporation of existing reports. It is 
a document that can be considered uni-inclusive, a document that embraced all the 
issues of sustainability over time. In this sense it was not simply a transformation of the 
old HS&E report, but rather the result of a new conceptual model which included aspects 
of HS&E but not just that (Interviewee IV, 07/2012). 
 
From the evidence gathered through the empirical investigation, it appears that the 
implementation of ‘sustainability reporting’, and the changes in existing accounting systems and 
techniques, created some puzzlement and friction between people involved in the process of 
reporting (see Fraser, 2012). This was illustrated by a comment of one of the interviewees: 
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The biggest watershed was defining the boundaries between the reporting that one 
department now had to do and what the other one had to do. It was an arduous task to 
move from HS&E to sustainability reporting, I remember the difficulties we encountered 
(Interviewee VI, 09/2012). 
 
Drawing from Laughlin’s (1991) ideas, we can view MARIO as being in some sort of ‘schizoid 
state’, or ‘out of equilibrium’, as a result of external (and internal) jolts. Fraser (2012) 
characterised such disequilibrium as “pockets of tension” (p. 514), which some people perceived 
as inevitable consequences of a “real” change process: 
 
In every change there are situations of tension because ‘old and new’ collide, there are 
always different views. There would not have been real change without the necessary 
moments of tension (Interviewee III, 07/2012). 
 
Fraser (2012, p.521) highlighted that such ‘fractured design archetypes’ have potential to derail 
any intended change process. However, such derailment did not occur in MARIO, and a new 
settled (though continually evolving) situation emerged. It seems that three factors were 
important for relatively smooth and timely transformation, namely: (1) the temporary nature of 
disequilibrium, (2) the evolutionary (rather than revolutionary) passing from ‘old’ to ‘new’ rules 
and routines, and (3) good communication to relevant personnel, with sufficient and helpful 
details of the required new procedures (rules). 
 
Teething issues, and even temporary conflict, is usually to be expected with even evolutionary 
change, as new rules are learned and new routines need to emerge; and, maybe also some re-
alignment is required along the way between new and old rules and/or routines (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). But, such ongoing re-adjustment and ‘reprogramming’ is normally quite minor in 
comparison to situations of adapting to revolutionary change, e.g., where there is change in the 
fundamental assumptions of a business (i.e., institutional change). As happened in MARIO, when 
change is facilitated through the introduction of new rules (and emerging new routines), the 
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change process tends to be smoother when there is clear communication about the required new 
ways. 
 
Following the publication of MARIO’s inaugural Sustainability Report, a proactive and 
increasingly empowered Sustainability Department was becoming more and more aware of 
further external developments that impinged on their company and that warranted some reaction. 
Towards the late-2000s, sustainability was gathering considerable momentum across (global) 
society in general; new sustainability-focused bodies were being created, as were global indices 
to measure (and declare!) just how sustainable an organisation was (not) being in its activities. 
Empowered by the CEO, the Sustainability Department recognised the importance of at least 
being seen to be involved with such external interests; the case for not being involved with such 
things was deemed risky. So, after the publication of the first report, MARIO became a member 
of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and joined two external 
‘prestigious’ sustainability indices: (1) the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), and (2) the 
FTSE4GOOD index.  
 
MARIO was actually rejected for its first application to join the DJSI index, but such was the 
determination to become associated with such “prestigious indexes” (the term used by one senior 
manager), the Sustainability Department promptly addressed their original application’s 
shortcomings, and MARIO was invited to join on a second attempt. The dynamics at play here 
illuminate how exogenous/external factors continuously (at least have potential to) impact an 
organisation’s approach towards sustainability. In this particular instance, whether or not there 
were corporate reputation and/or image-related motives behind such ‘prestigious’ memberships, 
the process of rejection mobilised further (re-)action that reinforced MARIO’s endeavours to 
bolster its ‘sustainability era’:  
 
Participation in the DJSI was a turning point - a compass of change. The fact that we 
were not initially admitted to the index was important, because we then used this inside 
the organisation as a lever to push change. Thus, this event reinforced the commitment to 
make the necessary changes (Interviewee III, 07/2012). 
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We might view this interaction between an organisation and its external environment (including 
stakeholders’ perceptions) as part of a strategic attempt to strengthen the sustainability plan. We 
were informed that the (relatively small number of) new staff recruited from outside were 
influential in the decision to join these external indices, but it was important that fresh ideas were 
complementary to the emerging rules and routines underpinning MARIO’s sustainability era. 
 
The impact of SEAR practices on broader organisational processes 
By the end of 2000s, the sustainability era in MARIO was reaching a level of maturity – i.e., a 
proactive Sustainability Department was in place, Sustainability Guidelines were established, and 
Sustainability Reports were now being produced. But, the development of (and changes to) 
SEAR practices was also having broader organisational impact(s), i.e., wider influences in terms 
of changes in intangible design archetypes, tangible sub-systems, and interpretive schemes 
(Laughlin, 1991). We will now consider some of these broader organisational change aspects, 
beginning with the influence of evolving SEAR practices (and the emergent ‘sustainability era’) on 
intangible design archetypes. 
 
First, evolving SEAR practices had influenced the creation of new employee groups, or as one 
interviewee put it, a “famiglia professionale” (i.e., professional family): 
  
This is a set of employees who not only do the same job, but who also have skills and 
competencies which are structured, uniform and consolidated. They comprise a group of 
employees who, though not necessarily part of the same organisational unit, constitute 
profiles with similar competencies and common developmental programs (Interviewee II, 
08/2011). 
 
Second, the development of SEAR practices was also a factor in shaping greater integration of 
MARIO’s management systems which, in turn, reinforced the elevation of sustainability to more 
senior (and strategic) levels rather than being isolated from other organisational practices. And, 
as we highlight in the following comment, this increase in information integration was not so much 
 24 
as radical a change as it might at first appear, but rather the evolution of existing rules and 
routines: 
 
The real added value of sustainability reporting is that it provides a more complete and 
holistic view of organisational activities under the umbrella of sustainable development. 
Sustainability reporting is a lens that allows us to see organisational phenomena from a 
unique perspective. You need to keep in mind that much of this information already 
existed in the organisation, but was produced and managed by different parts of the 
organisation. Thus the implementation of sustainability reporting has promoted integration 
of our existing information systems, in order to provide a unique view of [MARIO’s] 
activities (Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
 
Developing SEAR practices were also influential in the design and issuing of a new “Ethical Code 
of Conduct”. The cumulative interconnection with past behaviour was apparent again, because 
this new Ethical Code was to a large extent an extension to (rather than the displacement or a 
radical re-configuration of) the previous “Code of Conduct”. Moreover, the new Ethical Code of 
Conduct was aligned to, and closely reflected, the rules established within the ‘Corporate 
Responsibility, Values and Conduct’ document in the mid-2000s (see above) that was issued 
when MARIO’s sustainability era was beginning to take root. 
 
As mentioned above, the emerging SEAR practices also had an impact on broader and tangible 
(sub-systems) organisational change. First, some new ‘sub-units’ were created by the 
Sustainability Department, for example they created a new department for managing ecosystem 
services, and they also appointed individuals, called “Focal Sustainability Points”, as experts who 
were scattered across the wider organisation, and who were primed and ready to give ‘local’ 
advice on sustainability-related matters. Next, there was an increase in sustainability-led projects, 
run mostly through the Sustainability Department. There were projects, for example, on: (1) the 
reduction of pollution, (see below, the ‘gas-flaring project’); (2) increased safety of operational 
activities and a reduction in employee-related incidents; and (3) increasing employee satisfaction. 
With regard to (2), initiatives had been undertaken to increase safety of the activities in ‘difficult-
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contexts’ (e.g., in deep water) through the adoption of more advanced technology such as the 
‘blow out preventer’ (i.e., an automatic system intended to control the flow from oil and gas wells). 
In addition, investments had been made to increase the number of hours dedicated to employee 
training (particularly in respect of safety) which in two years increased from approximately 2.5 to 
over 3.1 million. MARIO also saw a decrease in the frequency and severity of employee-related 
incidents, which reduced by 50% and 60% respectively from 2007 to 2010. With regard to (3), 
this involved a survey amongst MARIO’s employees and, once again, there was evidence of how 
such an initiative was facilitated through the cumulative and expanding base of rules and routines 
embedded in the ‘sustainability era’ approach: 
  
This initiative was possible because of the changes that had previously occurred. The 
answers that were gathered in the survey were used as input for further actions to 
improve the internal performance. It was an initiative through which we were able to listen 
to the expectations of our employees. At the same time, it was important because it 
provided information for the preparation of our reporting in the following year (Interviewee 
III, 07/2012).   
 
There were also new and, in some instances, re-invigorated initiatives run in collaboration with 
external parties such as the local government and Universities. For example, as mentioned 
above, there was a ‘gas-flaring reduction project’ which aimed to “eliminate combustion into the 
atmosphere of the gases associated with oil and gas production and to increase its re-use (i.e. 
flaring down)” (source: MARIO’S Sustainability Report). This particular project had been an 
intention of MARIO over many years; however it was the growing momentum embedded in 
sustainability-rooted organisational rules and routines which not only reinforced these intentions 
but also provided a greater internal legitimacy and ‘corporate sense’ for such things to now 
happen7. In particular, MARIO was one of the first companies in its sector to associate the 
reduction of gas-flaring (and the increase of ‘flaring down’) with the implementation of 
electrification projects aimed at producing electricity for local communities. In recent years, 
                                                 
7 In terms of performance, MARIO has seen a considerable reduction in the gas flaring produced 
which has decreased more than 30% over the period 2007-2010. In some specific areas, the 
percentage of ‘flaring down” (i.e. gas re-used) was more than 75% in 2010 compared to less than 
50% in 2000. 
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MARIO has invested significantly in these projects, across highly-complex situations like the oil 
rich countries in Africa.   
 
Finally, the maturing SEAR practices began to have more influence on the interpretive schemes 
within MARIO (Laughlin, 1991). More specifically, as time progressed, sustainability became 
increasingly formalised in high-level corporate strategising. New (and an expanding number of) 
key measures that highlighted sustainability (non-)performance were reaching the radar of 
strategic decision-makers in the organisation:  
 
After the creation of our Sustainability Department and the implementation of 
Sustainability Reporting, the old HS&E targets gradually became objectives for the entire 
corporation. For example, an old HS&E target for the ‘reduction of flaring’ is now 
incorporated into a section of MARIO’s strategic planning. So, through the processes of 
aiming for sustainable development, a series of objectives that previously had not been 
considered for strategic planning, are now included in MARIO’s strategic corporate 
planning (Interviewee II, 08/2011). 
 
Essentially, sustainability-grounded rules were not only being elevated to, but also formally 
integrated into, high-level corporate strategies. And, with that came empowerment for certain 
actors to enforce new rules and routines across the organisation. Notwithstanding, such 
developments will need time until they really consolidate and, as we discuss in more detail later, 
this is not to say that such sustainability-grounded rules or routines become predominant and/or 
displace other more dominant business ways. As we discuss later, such developments in SEAR 
practices, including the elevation of SEAR-grounded measures to the level of strategic planning, 
represented progress in terms of the original corporate intentions. However, such measures 
ultimately failed to impact the dominance of ‘profit-seeking’ institutions in the organisation 
 
Our observations seem consistent with some of the conclusions in Adams and McNicholas’s 
(2007) arguments about the importance of SEAR for mobilising organisational change, when 
intertwined with corporate strategising. In addition, our findings would also seem to resonate with 
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Adams & McNicholas’s (2007) claims that SEAR can foster “reinforcing sustainability principles 
throughout the organisation [and] integration of sustainability issues into the strategic planning 
process” (pp. 398-399). The incorporation of sustainability-focused measures and targets into the 
strategic ‘dashboard’ would seem to be a pre-requisite for strong-form routinisation of 
sustainability practices: 
 
The real change - or at least one of the most important in MARIO - is the fact that 
everything which could be considered as part of sustainability strategy is perfectly and 
fully integrated, and embedded. There is no separate planning for sustainability; they are 
an integral part of [MARIO]’s operational and strategic planning (Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
 
Towards a Normative System and Integrated Reporting 
By the end of the 2000s, the development of sustainability reporting practices, and 
interconnected broader organisational change, was such that a new “Normative System” was 
formalised in the shape of a “Corporate Pyramid”. At the top of the Pyramid was the ethical code, 
followed next by policies (including SEAR-related policies). Next, there were corporate 
governance systems and regulatory compliance(s) and, finally, at the base of the pyramid were 
’management system guidelines’ (MSGs). These MSGs created a ‘bridge’ between overriding 
corporate policies and operational initiatives; in other words, they were the rules at the ground 
level which translated higher level (more abstract) policies into what actually should be done. 
 
More change was experienced around 2010, brought about by inconsistencies between existing 
SEAR practices at that point in time and: (1) the new ‘normative system’ on the one hand, and (2) 
developments in the external (social/environmental) setting on the other. Once again, such 
further (ongoing) change reflects both the cumulative nature of changes in SEAR practices, and 
the interconnectedness of such practices with (1) broader aspects of organisational activity, and 
(2) the continually evolving external context. It was around this time, particularly after the 
formalisation of the Pyramid, and the continuing elevation of sustainability to corporate-
strategising, that senior managers began to question the effectiveness of their existing 
sustainability reporting mechanisms to meet corporate objectives. We can say that continuously 
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evolving organisational, social and environmental circumstances were demanding ongoing re-
calibration of the sustainability-related rules and routines in MARIO. One interviewee 
commented: 
 
At this period of time, our sustainability reporting was not sufficient to represent all the 
complexities and changes that had occurred in [MARIO] (Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
 
Another added: 
 
We felt that we had exploited all the potential of our sustainability report. We recognised 
the limits of this tool, and we felt that we needed to find something new. In addition, we 
observed significant diversification in the information requirements of different 
stakeholders - investors, environmentalist groups, NGOs, etc. On the one hand, there 
were stakeholders concerned with the reporting of emissions - business by business, and 
country by country. On the other hand, there were stakeholders who were still interested 
in reporting emissions but also the corporate strategies that we had in place for reducing 
emissions. Thus, we felt a need to implement a sustainability reporting system that 
allowed integration of different tools (Interviewee II, 08/2011).  
 
In the early 2010s, MARIO adopted what they described as a “reporting mix” system, and they 
subsequently published their first Integrated Sustainability Report, thus replacing the 
‘Sustainability Report’ of several years. With these developments, a new phase in the ‘SEAR life’ 
commenced. We have already discussed in detail how the momentum of intra-organisational 
change (and proactive, powerful agency) can influence the magnitude and path of further 
change. But, in terms of integrated reporting, ‘external developments’ (or, using Laughlin’s terms, 
‘environmental disturbances’) certainly had an effect on MARIO. First, there was growing 
stakeholder expectation that leading multinational organisations adopt an integrated reporting 
approach: 
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There was a strong international trend that demanded the integration of sustainability-
related information into the financial statements. This is considered a means to increase 
the reliability of the information (Interviewee II, 08/2011). 
 
Further reinforcement of MARIO’s adoption of integrated reporting came through participation in 
a pilot programme launched by the IIRC (The International Integrated Reporting Council)8 whose 
purpose is to evaluate the effects of adopting the integrated reporting model in (real) 
organizations. 
 
MARIO’s integrated report comprised: (1) a list of key sustainability-related targets that were 
integrated alongside other financial and non-financial targets, (2) the company’s performance 
against such targets, and (3) information on MARIO’s sustainability strategies: 
 
To respond to the information demands of our different stakeholders, we have done three 
things, namely: (1) prepared an integrated financial statement, which also includes a 
section about sustainability; (2) created an interactive tool that allows detailed analysis of 
our sustainability performance; and (3) added a strategic document, written in a language 
accessible to a wider audience (Interviewee II, 08/2011).  
 
With the implementation of an integrated reporting system, new rules and routines emerged to 
regulate the processes of gathering, collecting, accounting and reporting sustainability-related 
information. These new routines altered, and in some cases replaced, prevailing routines that 
had underpinned the previous sustainability reporting systems: 
 
Through our integrated system, information is transferred from our database to the 
Sustainability Department, which then uses such information to undertake our reporting. 
The entire process of integrated reporting is formalised; such formal procedures have to 
provide reliable data and have to ensure the reliability of the process of collecting, 
                                                 
8 The International Integrated Reporting Council (the IIRC) is an “international cross section of 
leaders from the corporate, investment, accounting, securities, regulatory, academic and 
standard-setting sectors” (http://www.theiirc.org/) whose purpose is to develop and propose a 
framework for integrated corporate reporting. 
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managing and reporting data that is to be included in the reporting system (Interviewee VII, 
09/2012). 
  
Although the launch of integrated reporting might appear to be a radical change for MARIO, 
indeed some interviewees commented how difficult the change had been from a technical point 
of view, the change was actually still evolutionary in the sense that it involved realignment and 
synchronisation of mostly existing reporting rules and routines, but again involved no 
revolutionary shift in dominant and underlying profit-seeking-oriented business assumptions. 
Furthermore, the working group which coordinated MARIO’s move to integrated reporting 
comprised of representatives from across the organisation.  
 
The implementation of integrated reporting had broader organisational impact, again what 
Laughlin (1991) referred to as the development of new ‘sub-systems’. More specifically, a new 
‘cross-functional working group’ was created, including the appointment of new employees and 
new resource demands which coordinates and facilitates the transition to, and further 
development of MARIO’s integrated reporting systems: 
 
We have recently created a cross-functional working group, which is overseen by a 
representative of the Chief Financial Officer. The working group comprises: a 
representative from our Sustainability Department, a person who is involved in putting 
together the Annual Report, a representative from each of the respective (3) departments 
of Strategy, Planning and Investor-relations, and representatives from the corporate 
governance unit and the risk management unit. The working group’s responsibility is to 
evaluate our application of the IIRC integrated reporting framework (Interviewee, III. 
07/2012).   
 
Finally, the implementation of the new ‘integrated reporting approach’ contributed to bolster the 
nature and role of SEAR as a strategic management control device. This was illustrated by a 
comment from one respondent: 
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Nowadays we are less interested than in the past in external reporting. Now our attention is 
focused on ensuring that our process of improvement is not an end in itself, but rather it is 
an overall benefit for our company. If we improve internally, as a consequence we can 
improve the relationship with the outside world and therefore also our external reporting. In 
the past, the process of reporting was unrelated to the management and control system, 
now instead, it is functional to our strategic management and control system of 
sustainability-related issues (Interviewee VI, 09/2012). 
       
6 - Discussion 
The main aim of our paper was to investigate the inter-relationship between organisational 
change and SEAR practices, as well as the roles and functioning of management accounting in 
this sphere. This is an important theme, as we have already explained, “to move beyond bald 
statements about the likelihood that (social and) environmental accounting interventions will 
either succeed or not succeed” (Larrinaga and Bebbington, 2001, p. 287). In this section we will 
reflect on some of the more interesting aspects of our case and its interpretation, including the 
usefulness of our adopted theory and potential implications for the future involvement of 
management accounting in developing sustainability principles and practices within 
organisations. 
 
Theoretical Lens 
Our theoretical approach comprised a combination of Laughlin’s (1991) ‘environmental 
disturbances’ framework and an OIE-informed conceptualisation of intra-organisational change 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). Laughlin’s framework was particularly helpful for categorising the 
nature of SEAR change, as well as highlighting the interconnectedness between such change 
and both broader organisational change and changing extra-organisational developments. 
Through the lens of this framework we were able to structure the change process partly in terms 
of interplay between external developments, changes in SEAR practices, and broader but co-
developing changes at the organisational level. For instance, we considered how external ‘jolts’ 
created an opening for the publication of a ‘Corporate Responsibility, Values and Conduct’ 
document and the appointment of a new, proactive and pro-sustainability CEO, as well as the 
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involvement of a Centre of Research which helped to promote a ‘sustainability era’. Next, a 
Sustainability Department and a report entitled ‘Commitments and Initiatives for Sustainable 
Development’ emerged, and these were a large part of why further changes were to later emerge 
in respect of the archetypes, sub-systems and interpretive schemes of MARIO.  
 
However, it is particularly the OIE theoretical lens (Burns and Scapens, 2000) which injects a 
processual and evolutionary dimension to our interpretation of SEAR practices and their effects in 
MARIO. We adopted ‘old’ institutional economics theory as a lens to make sense of developing 
SEAR practices over time in MARIO. In so doing, we were not arguing that such theory is 
superior to alternative theoretical approaches; however, we do argue that an OIE theoretical 
approach seems at least to offer a useful starting point for carrying out SEAR-related interpretive 
case studies. And, we certainly recommend more similar case studies of real organisations in the 
future. In particular we would argue that such theoretically-informed case studies would be 
important for extending our knowledge and conceptualisation of unfolding SEAR practices, 
beyond overly-normative approaches that seek mostly to facilitate ‘successful’ change.  
 
It was through an OIE-informed perspective that we captured why and how our case organisation 
introduced multiple new SEAR-related rules, and how associated routines developed in time 
which, in the main, further reinforced the original rules. These new SEAR rules and routines are 
in a continual process of interaction over time; they underpin and ‘pass on’ know-how through 
time (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Scapens, 1994); and they carry a connectedness in the 
underlying change process. Rules or routines do not ‘just appear’ and/or disappear as stand-
alone events; they are interconnected, self-reinforcing (but can clash also), and have been 
likened to biological ‘genes’ as phenomena which ‘carries’ organisational DNA and ‘memory’ 
through time: “[…] rules and routines are the processes through which organisational traits are 
transmitted through time” (Scapens, 1994, p.310).  
 
Our OIE-informed lens was particularly helpful for conceptualising how much of the changes 
implemented (i.e., new rules) were to an extent grounded in prior/existing practices, thereby 
normally facilitating a smoother transition than might otherwise have occurred. With an OIE lens, 
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we also maintained focus on the interplay between SEAR and the external (i.e., social, 
environmental) context over time, unlike Laughlin’s framework which normally portrays the 
external context as stand-alone ‘shocks’ which come and go. In our approach we viewed the 
external context as a continuous dimension to the unfolding change processes for MARIO. For 
example, we saw how external factors such as growth in industry regulation were important in the 
early stages of the change process, for igniting awareness around the importance of 
sustainability and sustainability-reporting. But, it is also important for us to consider why and how 
such external influences impact reaction, and the consequences of such (re-)action. Much later, 
rooted in concerns over how their organisation was being perceived in the outside world, from a 
sustainability perspective, MARIO joined two key external sustainability indices and became a 
member of WBCSD. In other words, the influence of external factors on intra-organisational 
matters can evolve (and change) over time, not just ‘at an instant’, and new influences can also 
emerge. In this respect, the present work has attempted to investigate further the oft-used notion 
of “assemblages” of change (Bebbington, 2007; Duncan and Thomson, 1998) which to us at least 
lacks a notion of cumulative dynamics over time. 
 
Our OIE-influenced framework also drew attention toward the importance of embedded agency 
for influencing why and how change takes place within organisations (Englund et al., 2011). Even 
in highly institutionalised situations, which many organisations are, change can still occur, and it 
is frequently through the initiation and drive of powerful individuals that we witness such change 
(Adams and McNicholas, 2007). In the MARIO case it was the CEO who particularly influenced 
the change process, that saw sustainability become at least a more routinised feature of 
organisational activity, and which eventually led to the implementation of integrated reporting in 
the early-2010s. Agency is therefore important; powerful individuals or groups are usually needed 
to get things done, at least in terms of elevating sustainability issues to the strategic level in an 
organisation and in promoting and communicating the implementation of new sustainability rules 
and routines. But, such agency does not occur in isolation to the existing organisational rules, 
routines and institutions; so, the latter need full consideration before designing any sustainability-
led change. Nor does such change occur in isolation to the external environment; external 
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impinging factors continue to evolve, and so further openings for change are possible ‘along the 
way’. 
 
In summary, we argued that to better understand the complex and cumulative aspects and 
effects of an organisation’s SEAR practices over time, it is sensible to adopt a theoretical 
perspective that is rooted in seeking to ‘see’ and explain unfolding (change) processes over time. 
An OIE-influenced perspective on organisational change offers focus on intra-organisational 
dynamics over time, with attention also given to broader and moveable (social, environmental) 
context. From a premise of organisational practice constituting largely rules and routines based 
behaviour, the adopted institutional approach helps bring to the fore the mechanisms through 
which organisations follow particular SEAR and sustainability paths. Viewing SEAR practices as 
ongoing practices over time conveys both change and no-change, and complexity across multiple 
organisational domains. Even when all appears to be stable (thus, ‘no change’), a processual 
approach takes as given that change can be (though is not necessarily) under way in broader 
contexts, which may or may not subsequently filter through to changes in an organisation’s 
settled way of doing or thinking. In this respect, especially, we argue that an OIE approach both 
complements and extends the ‘environmental disturbances’ framework on change, which has a 
tendency to overstate inertia (Bebbington, 2007; Gray et al., 1995). Indeed, we would certainly 
encourage future research that, in the context of investigating SEAR and other sustainability-
related themes, further explores potential synergies, integration even, of the two theoretical 
frameworks adopted in this paper. 
 
Implications for Management Accounting 
In our case study, SEAR became increasingly integral to more holistic forms of corporate 
reporting that to a large extent seemed capable of simultaneously serving the requirements of 
both internal and external stakeholders. But, such requirements it would seem are inter-
connected, they are not separate exercises. There was evidence in our case study that as well as 
accepting that an organisation should at least be seen by external stakeholders to be behaving in 
a sustainable way, it also usually makes good economic sense to ‘be (or to appear) sustainable’ 
(see below for more discussion of this point). Thus, it appears that tomorrow’s organisation needs 
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internal reporting systems that will facilitate sustainability-focused planning, control, strategising, 
and more. One interviewee stated: 
 
Sustainability reporting represents the activities of gathering, collecting and integrating 
sustainability information into a unique database, with the purpose of providing a set of 
key performance indicators. It is a tool which fundamentally has an internal objective; in 
MARIO, the primary purpose of sustainability reporting is to improve the internal activities 
of management and control (Interviewee II, 08/2011). 
 
The above quotation raises potential implications for an organisation’s management accounting 
practices, since it is the management accounting systems which usually produce the bulk of 
information that facilitates the internal decision-making processes of an organisation. In MARIO, 
it would seem that management accounting had become more intertwined with, rather than 
separate to, its external reporting process. In large part due to increasing global concern and 
expectations towards sustainable behaviour, tomorrow’s organisations can ill afford to ignore 
their sustainability impact. For many (and a growing number of) organisations, though not always 
for the same reasons, sustainability is now a consideration that transcends both internal and 
external reporting processes which, in turn, possibly mirror each other more than ever before.  
 
This ‘mirroring’ between internal and external reporting is observable, for example, through the 
measures being used by organisations to gauge and convey their (non-)performance. This is not 
to say, however, that a de-coupling between external and internal reporting would no longer 
happen, indeed we fully expect that managers will continue to skilfully manage especially what 
they report externally, including the infusion of rhetoric and disguise (Hopwood, 2009b). But there 
does seem to be much still to learn about the relationship between an organisation’s external 
reporting on the one hand and its internal reporting mechanisms (including management 
accounting practices) on the other. Further, we might ask if there has been a change in recent 
times in how managers view this interrelationship between external and internal reporting. 
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Organisations incorporate (some of the) sustainability issues in both internal and external 
reporting tools because, we argue, it is not only becoming increasingly expected of them, but also 
because it makes little economic sense not to do so. We are, it seems, in times of considerable 
change in both form and purpose for organisational reporting, i.e., internal and external reporting, 
but also the interrelationship between them. For instance, in recent times there has been plenty 
of evidence to show the elevation of non-financial performance measurement in both internal and 
external reporting, as well as such measurement characteristics becoming more formally 
constituted in strategic planning and control. As the traditional guardian of an organisation’s 
information base, management accounting has the opportunity to steer such developments in 
corporate reporting in the future, thus offering significant opportunities for management 
accountants, although they are highly likely to face professional competition in such matters. 
 
Management accounting is very much implicated in the process of organisations becoming (or at 
least appearing to become) more sustainable. Hopwood (2009b) highlights some of the multiple 
ways in which management accounting and similar calculative practices will remain inevitably 
intertwined with the process through which organisations tackle the sustainability challenge: 
 
Trade-offs would still have to be evaluated, interests would still diverge, thereby suggesting a 
role for incentives to engender change, intentions would still need to be checked against 
achievements and there still would be areas where careful analyses of alternative approaches 
would need to guide action (p.433). 
 
We considered in our case study how information is fundamental to the cumulative path(s) 
through which SEAR practices become what they are. Whether an organisation’s push to 
become more sustainable is grounded in core ‘good cop’ values at one extreme or 
reputation/image-management on the other (or maybe some combination of both), the process is 
heavily dependent upon the production and use of information. Increasingly, it appears, such 
information is required to be holistic, integrated, and predictive as well as historical. This inter-
twining of the development of an organisation’s sustainability and its management accounting 
practices, however, should be treated with some caution. That is, because when stripped down to 
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its basic premise, management accounting is fundamentally a professional practice which seeks 
to assist managers to make decisions that will maximise their economic returns and, in the 
context of prior discussions, management accounting thus plays an important role in facilitating 
and reinforcing the dominant intra-organisational institution pertaining to profit-seeking. The basis 
of management accounting’s conventional wisdom is neoclassical economic theory, including 
underpinning assumptions of rational behaviour and market equilibrium (Scapens, 1994). Such 
premise of management accounting, we argue, does not sit comfortably alongside sustainable 
development – see below for further discussion of these important issues. 
 
Recently, there have been some attempts to broaden the impact of management accounting in 
non-profit-maximising situations, for example an increased use of management accounting 
techniques in the public sector. However, most of the evidence to-date highlights that financial or 
economic achievements as opposed to social and/or environmental goals still take priority. For 
instance, the prevailing approach to costing in most types of organisation, private or public 
sector, do not interject sufficient consideration of the very real indirect consequences of corporate 
action on society and the environment (Hopwood, 2009b; also Gray et al, 1993). Also, 
predominant methods for capital (project) appraisal in business were still those which favour 
short-term economic gains, as opposed to elevating long-run and more environmentally 
sustainable approaches (ibid.). 
 
Others in the management accounting field have tried to develop the non-financial (or ‘intangible’) 
aspect of its tools and techniques, so attempting to de-emphasise any predominant focus on 
financial or economic returns. One such example would be the increasingly popular use of the 
‘balanced scorecard’ (Kaplan and Norton, 1996), which represents a holistic performance 
management tool that measures the (non-)achievement in ‘intangible’ business activities, such as 
customer loyalty, quality of service, and investment in workforce satisfaction. There is evidence 
that more organisations are integrating social/environmental measures into their balanced 
scorecards (Dey and Burns, 2010), or similar management tools, to help steer them both 
operationally and strategically. However, caution is needed yet again; such ‘alternative’ forms of 
management accounting are still grounded in the achievement of long-run financial or economic 
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returns. There is an underpinning assumption for all balanced scorecards that improved 
mobilisation of intangible business assets will eventually lead to economic gains; and, again, 
such a premise may not necessarily represent the ‘best’ way forward in terms of sustainability 
and sustainable development (Norreklit, 2000). The future importance of management 
accounting in the quest towards improved sustainability and sustainable development is not in 
question; but there is a very real chance of fundamental changes taking place in the discipline’s 
underpinning roots and methodological assumptions: “[…] to delve deeper into the assumptions 
involved and into the wider issues that might be at stake […] raising questions about the 
adequacy of prevailing understandings about costs and their association with very particular 
assumptions about the nature of organizations and their boundaries” (Hopwood, 2009b, p.434).  
 
Absence of ‘Revolutionary’ Institutional change 
The discussion above steers our attention towards the primary objectives and embedded 
assumptions of commercial organisations and, in particular, the institutionalised notion of 
economic profits. Our case study indicated how SEAR practices and sustainability more generally 
became an increasingly important part of an organisation’s value creation, re-enacted and 
reproduced over time through continual interaction of sustainability rules and routines. However, 
this might constitute a frail commitment; put simply, some organisations may ‘join the 
sustainability club’ because the business case to do so outweighs the business case to not do so.  
 
In the MARIO case study, we learned how despite the development of sustainability-focused 
rules and routines, the overriding ‘economic institutions’ (i.e., settled assumptions concerning the 
pursuit of profits) remained dominant, though quite possibly in subtly different ways (see below). 
One interviewee said: “At the end of the day, the main objective of this company is always to 
make more and more profit - and this can not be otherwise” (Interviewee IV, 07/2012). Moreover, 
we saw just how important management accounting was for the maintenance and bolstering of 
such assumptions through time, and enabling the objectification and quantification of such 
dominant interests. Hopwood (2009b) has addressed such tensions previously, as he describes 
how “[…] accounting practices and other calculative technologies seemingly have become 
intimately tied up with what has been the increasingly single minded attention placed […] on 
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profitability” (p.799). Importantly, in OIE and Laughlin’s (1991) terms, we can say that there was 
no institutional or morphogenetic change in our case organisation, to the extent that dominant 
economic-rooted assumptions concerning profit-seeking remained stronger than anything else. 
While we witnessed development over time of SEAR rules and routines, particularly once 
sustainability issues became integral to corporate-strategising, it would be hard to claim that 
‘institutions’ of sustainability (at least in terms of becoming dominant business ways) really 
emerged. 
 
This observation, we contend, raises questions about the extent to which we might think and talk 
in terms of ‘embedding’ sustainability and/or instilling sustainability ‘mind-sets’ (Fraser, 2012). In 
MARIO, we witnessed how new SEAR rules and routines developed and generally grew in 
maturity. For this to actually happen, it appeared that important dynamics included senior 
management support, and a change programme that included sound communication, advisory 
support and some incentivisation.  
 
So, sustainability can become an important and integral part of both operational and strategic life, 
technically at least. And, why should we really be surprised at that? But it did not displace 
dominant profit-seeking assumptions, which further highlights that when change is introduced 
(e.g., new SEAR practices), existing institutions matter. Reinforcing this, two interviewees 
highlighted that there was no tension between profit-seeking and sustainability, and that 
ultimately one mattered the most – that is, the institution of profit-seeking. The first interviewee 
commented: 
 
I believe that our role as a corporation is to produce energy, and to make profit. But, 
clearly we make more and better profit if we act in a more sustainable way. In my opinion, 
to speak about any trade-offs is old-hat (Interviewee I, 08/2011). 
 
A second interviewee added: 
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Sustainability can only be successful if it is considered as something that can give you a 
competitive advantage or in some other way fosters the creation of economic value 
(Interviewee IV, 07/2012). 
 
So, sustainability in organisations would seem to be becoming embedded within (and blended 
with) dominant economic institutions; it is not simply bolted-on, nor is it likely to displace the 
dominance of profit-seeking assumptions: 
 
At the end of the day, what emerges very clearly is that sustainability is actually business 
[...] and, in the long term these two things blend together (Interviewee X, 10/2012). 
 
In this organisation, sustainable practice has become a part of strategising for earning economic 
profits and long term (business) development. So, in some sense this form of ‘profit’ is maybe 
different to conventional (i.e., neoclassical) notions of profit; this may or may not be cause for 
concern, it may be a fragile concept, but we suggest there is enough in our case evidence to 
suggest further exploration into such matters. However, it is also difficult not to suspect that 
behind the veil of sustainability is a real sense of awareness that at least being seen to be 
sustainable enhances the likelihood of improving economic profits.  
 
Based on our case findings, and for commercially-oriented organisations at least, it would appear 
that sustainability and sustainable development rules and routines can gain ground (e.g., new 
tools and techniques), and peoples’ perceptions of what sustainability represents can change, but 
only likely if it aligns to dominant economic institutions rather than stressing against them. And, in 
this sense, sustainability that becomes integrated into corporate-strategising will likely bolster 
rather than change the dominance of economic institutions. On the other hand, a world of 
commercial organisations that give considerably greater weight to sustainability-rooted 
institutions over economic institutions would as yet seem a long way off, and probably represents 
an unrealistic long-term expectation. This comes across in the following interviewee’s comment: 
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It is clear to everybody, including top management, that (what we call) sustainability can 
be an important lever for MARIO’s competitive and strategic success. So, for example, 
our managers who undertake exploration and production activities with an eye on local 
community and environmental impacts do not do this because there is someone who says 
that “it’s sustainability strategy”. They do this because it is corporate strategy; it is as if 
there has been strong integration of sustainability into corporate strategies, to the extent 
that managers do not perceive such situations as being something ‘to do with’ 
sustainability. It is the way MARIO has to act (Interviewee II, 08/2011). 
 
So, if we are to believe this, at least in the foreseeable future, profits and economic value are 
what ultimately matters to commercial organisations, we should ask what implications this has for 
policy-making? What regulation and (dis-)incentives can be initiated by the likes of governments 
(Gray and Milne, 2002), influential professional bodies and of course organisations to encourage 
profit-making at less cost to society and the environment? What new management accounting 
tools and techniques can ‘best’ achieve such objectives? 
 
Then, what about in the long-run? Are there more radical (but also realistic) alternatives? Should 
we spend as much attention to how we define ‘profit’ as the time we spend on its calculative 
methods and outputs? We should possibly be looking more broadly and more critically at the 
conventional notion of ‘profit’, and potentially nuanced forms, especially when we are considering 
the role and functioning of management accounting tools in sustainable development. We should 
be looking to new conceptualisations, new concepts and new foci for how we account for society 
and the environment, developing as new alternative flows of management information.  
 
Discussions above would suggest that leaving things simply to drift along with an a-critical view of 
management accounting might be invidious, and not entirely pulling in the direction of a more 
harmonious relationship between organisations and the environment. There are also questions to 
be had as to whether or not “[…] the ethical considerations of the environmentalists (can) be 
transferred to the economic market place? Or will the values of the market place overwhelm 
those of the environmental sphere […] to the longer term detriment of original concerns” 
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(Hopwood, 2009b, p.435). These are the sorts of questions that we cannot answer here; 
however, they do need much more consideration in the future.  
 
At least in the short-term, it would appear that working with assumed dominant economic 
institutions, rather than seeking more revolutionary changes in our society, would be the most 
sensible and realistic way forward. We would argue that dominant political and social structures, 
and powerful vested interests, render any ‘revolutionary’ changes in the assumed ways of ‘doing 
business’ unlikely in the foreseeable future. Such an approach toward change will inextricably 
demand the expertise of financial- and information-astute management accountants. But, as we 
have intimated here, such challenges for the future will (or should) constitute far more than 
‘simple’ extension of conventional techniques in the pursuit of profit-maximising ‘success’. 
 
7 - Concluding Remarks 
We have investigated the complex, interrelated and cumulative relationships between 
organisational change and SEAR practices, but also the role of management accounting in 
facilitating such organisational dynamics. Responding to calls for more in-depth studies of 
social/environmental accounting intervention in the corporate realm (Dey, 2007; Fraser, 2012), 
we have combined Laughlin’s (1991) ‘environmental disturbances’ framework and an OIE-
informed perspective on organisational change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) to make sense of the 
unfolding dynamics between the environment, organisational and, more specifically SEAR, 
practices. Exogenous factors were seen to continually interplay with the intra-organisational 
sphere, and have ongoing potential to shape the (re-)actions of powerful agents; and the 
interaction between emergent SEAR-related rules and routines was influential upon, and 
implicated in broader organisational change (and vice-versa). Important to, and weaving 
throughout this ongoing process of change was the production, use and evolution of information 
within the case company. Information, mobilising various calculative techniques but most 
prominently management accounting, was necessary to visualise and make sense of the 
changes that were taking place, not only in terms of SEAR practices but also in broader 
organisational terms. 
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However, although we witnessed technical ‘success’ in terms of implementing new SEAR 
practices, our case also highlighted that these sustainability-related developments needed to be 
carried out within an assumed profit-oriented model. Furthermore, if an important aim is to be 
encouraging more ‘sustainable profits’, we should be cautious about simply trying to extend 
conventional management accounting tools and techniques. As discussed above, future notions 
of ‘profit’ will not necessarily replicate ‘profits’ that persist in management accounting today; the 
journey forward in sustainable development will almost certainly demand changes in the practice 
of management accounting. 
 
References 
Adams, C., and McNicholas, P., 2007. Making a difference: sustainability reporting, accountability 
and organizational change. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 20(3), 383-402.  
Albelda-Perez, E., Correa-Ruiz, C. and Carrasco-Fenech, F., 2007. Environmental management 
systems and management accounting practices as engagement tools for Spanish 
companies, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 20(3), 403-422. 
Antheaume, N., 2007. Full cost accounting: Adam Smith meets Rachel Carson?, in Unerman, J., 
Bebbington, J. and O’Dwyer, B., Sustainability Accounting and Accountability, Routledge: 
London. 
Bebbington, J., 2007. Changing organizational attitudes and culture through sustainability 
accounting in Unerman, J., Bebbington, J. and O’Dwyer, B., Sustainability Accounting and 
Accountability, Routledge: London. 
Buhr N., 1998. Environmental Performance, legislation and annual report disclosure: the case of 
acid rain and Falconbrigde. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 11(2), 163-90. 
Burns, J., 2000. The dynamics of accounting change: Inter-play between new practices routines, 
institutions, power and politics. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 13(5), 566–
96. 
Burns, J. and Baldvinsdottir, G., 2005. An institutional perspective of accountants’ new roles - the 
interplay of contradictions and praxis, European Accounting Review, 14(4), 725-57. 
Burns, J., and Scapens, R. W., 2000. Conceptualizing Management Accounting Change: An 
Institutional framework. Management Accounting Research, 11, 3-25. 
 44 
Burns, J., and Quinn, M., 2011. The routinisation of management controls in software. Journal of 
Management Control, 22, 5-24. 
Busco, C., Riccaboni, A., and Scapens, R. W., 2006. Trust for accounting and accounting for 
trust, Management Accounting Research, 17(1), 11-41. 
Colby, M.E., 1991, Environmental management in development: the evolution of paradigms, 
Ecological Economics, 3(3), 193-213. 
Contrafatto, M., 2009. The process of institutionalization of social and environmental reporting: A 
narrative from an Italian case study, unpublished working paper presented at the 21st 
CSEAR International Congress on Social and Environmental Accounting Research, St. 
Andrews (UK), September.  
Contrafatto, M., 2012. Social and environmental accounting and organizational change: what, 
where and why? A personal overview”, in Arena P. and Cardillo E. (Eds.), Social and 
Environmental Accounting- Research advances and new perspectives, ARACNE, Rome.   
Dey, C., 2007. Social Accounting at Traidcraft plc: A struggle for the meaning of fair trade. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, (20)3, 423-45. 
Dey, C.R. and Burns, J., 2010. Integrated Reporting at Novo Nordisk, in Hopwood, A., Unerman, 
J. and Fries, J. (Eds), Accounting for Sustainability: Practical Insights, Earthscan, 215-32. 
Duncan O. and Thomson I., 1998. Waste Accounting and Cleaner Technology: A Complex 
Evaluation, Asian Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference Proceedings, 
Osaka, August. 
Englund, H., Gerdin, J. and Burns, J., 2011. 25 years of Giddens in accounting research: 
achievements, limitations and the future, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36(8), 494-
513.  
Fraser, M., 2012. ‘Fleshing out’ an Engagement with a Social Accounting Technology. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 25(3), 508-34. 
Gray, R., 2011. Sustainability + Accounting Education: the elephant in the classroom, paper 
presented at the BAFA Special Interest Group on Accounting Education Conference, 
Winchester, UK. 
Gray, R. and Milne, M., 2002. Sustainability Reporting: who is kidding whom? Chartered 
Accountants Journal of New Zealand, July, 66-70. 
 45 
Gray, R., Bebbington, J. and Walters, D., 1993, Accounting for the environment. Paul Chapman 
in Association with the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants, London.  
Gray, R. H., Walters, D., Bebbington, J. and Thompson, I., 1995. The Greening of Enterprise: An 
Exploration of the (non) Role of Environmental Accounting and Environmental Accountants 
in Organisational Change. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 6(3), 211-39. 
Hamilton, W. H., 1932. Institution, in Seligman, E. R. A. and Johnson, A. (Eds.), Encyclopaedia 
of Social Science, 73(4), 560-95. 
Hopwood, A. G., 2009a. The economic crisis and accounting: implications for the research 
community. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34, 797–802. 
Hopwood, A. G., 2009b. Accounting and the environment. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 34, 433–9.  
International Integrated Reporting Council (accessed in October 2012). Available: 
http://www.theiirc.org/ 
Johansson, I.-L. and Balvinsdottir, G., 2003. Accounting for trust: some empirical evidence. 
Management Accounting Research, 14(3), 219-34. 
Kaplan, R. and Norton, D., 1996. The Balanced Scorecard. Harvard Business School Press. 
KPMG, 2011. International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting. The Netherlands: 
KPMG International Global Sustainability Services.  
Larrinaga-González, C., Carrasco-Fenech, F., Caro-Gonzalez, F. J., Correa-Ruiz, C., and Páez-
Sandubete, M., 2001. The role of environmental accounting in organizational change: an 
exploration of Spanish companies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 14(2), 213-
39. 
Larrinaga-González, C. and Bebbington, J., 2001. Accounting change or Institutional 
appropriation? A case study of the implementation of environmental accounting. Critical 
Perspective on Accounting, 12(3), 269-92. 
Laughlin, R., 1991. Environmental disturbances and organizational transitions and 
transformations: some alternative models. Organization studies, 12(2), 209-32. 
Lukka, K., 2007. Management accounting change and stability: loosely coupled rules and 
routines in action. Management Accounting Research, 18, 76-101. 
 46 
Milne, M., J., Tregidga, H. and Walton. S. (2009) Words not actions! The ideological role of 
sustainable development reporting, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 22(8), 
1211-1257 
Nelson, R. & Winter, S., 1982. An evolutionary theory of economic change, Harvard College, 
USA.  
Nørreklit, H., 2000. The balance on the balanced scorecard – a critical analysis of some of its 
assumptions. Management Accounting Research, 11, 65-88. 
O’Dwyer B., 2004. Qualitative Data Analysis: Illuminating a process for transforming a ‘messy’ 
but ‘attractive’ ‘nuisance’. In C. Humphrey & B. Lee (Eds.), The real life guide to accounting 
research: A behind-the-scenes view of using qualitative research methods. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Olsen, M.E., Lodwick, D.G. and Dunlap, R.E. (1992), Viewing the World Ecologically, Westview 
Press, Boulder, CO. 
Quinn, M., 2011. Routines in management accounting research: further exploration. Journal of 
Accounting and Organizational Change, 7(4), 337-57. 
Ribeiro, J. A. and Scapens, R. W., 2006. Institutional theories in management accounting 
change: contributions, issues and paths for development, Qualitative Research in 
Accounting and Management, 3(2), 94-111. 
Scapens, R. W., 1994. Never mind the gap: towards an institutional perspective of management 
accounting practices, Management Accounting Research, 5(3/4), 301-21. 
Scapens, R., 2006. Understanding management accounting practices: a personal journey. British 
Accounting Review, 38, 1–30. 
Siti-Nabiha, A. K. and Scapens, R. W., 2005. Stability and change: an institutionalist study of 
management accounting change. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 18(1), 44-
73. 
Soin, K., Seal, W., & Cullen, J., 2002. ABC and organisational change: an institutional 
perspective. Management Accounting Research, 13, 249–71. 
Thomson I., 2007. Mapping the terrain of sustainability accounting, in Unerman, J., Bebbington, 
J. and O’Dwyer, B., Sustainability Accounting and Accountability, Routledge 
United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987). Our 
Common Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 47 
 
 
Year (Approx.) 
 
 
Environmental jolts 
 
SEAR-related development 
 
Year 1 
 
a) Increase in industry 
regulation 
b) General increase in societal 
concern over climate change 
and human rights’ protection 
c) Corporate expectation of 
more legislation 
d) New Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) appointed 
 
 Corporate Responsibility, 
Values and Conduct 
document published 
 
Year 1 to Year 2 
a) Links established with 
Centre of Research (COR) 
 Sustainability Project  
established 
 Commitments and 
Initiatives for Sustainable 
Development report issued  
 
 
Year 2 to Year 3 
  Sustainability Department 
formed 
 Foundation established 
 Inaugural Sustainability 
Report published 
 Guidelines on Sustainability 
and Protection of Human 
Rights published 
 
Year 3 to Year 6 
a) Membership of the World 
Business Council for 
Sustainable Development 
b) Joins the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI) 
c) Joins the FTSE4GOOD 
index 
 
 Ethical Code of Conduct 
published 
 Focal Sustainability Points 
established, and notable 
increase in sustainability-
facing projects 
 
Year 6 onwards 
a) Stakeholders expectations 
for ‘integrated reporting’ 
b) Participation in the IIRC pilot 
programme about 
“Integration reporting” 
 
 Corporate Pyramid 
(normative) system 
established 
 Adoption of a Reporting Mix 
System 
 Inaugural Integrated 
Sustainability Report 
 
 
Figure 1. A timeline of environmental jolts and SEAR-related developments in MARIO 
 
Note: The time frame of the case study spanned for eight years beginning from the mid-2000s.  
Year 1 is used to denote the start of the period, Year 2 denotes two years from the starting point 
and so on.   
